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Strikers, 1935-1991: Public Policy Implications
Michael H. LeRoyt
Employer hiring of permanent replacements for economic strikers' has
become one of the most controversial labor law issues since the early 1980s.2
While such hirings have occurred for over a century in the United States3 and
were recognized as lawful in 1938 by the Supreme Court,4 the extensive use
and threat to use permanent replacements by major U.S. employers during the
1980s and early 1990s have intensified attention and debate surrounding the
issue.5
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1. In general, an economic striker is an employee who withholds her labor with the objective of
improving or preserving her compensation or conditions of employment. See generally 2 ABA SECTION
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1100 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed.
1992).
2. Bruce E. Kaufman, Research on Strike Models and Outcomes in the 1980s:Accomplishments and
Shortcomings, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES 77 (David
Lewin et al. eds., 1992).
3. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 9 A. 559 (Vt. 1887); Crump v. Commonwealth, 6 S.E. 620 (Va.
1888); State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890 (Conn. 1888) (discussing early cases in which employers hired striker
replacements).
4. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
5. Employers using permanent replacements include Continental Airlines, see In re Continental
Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990); O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 886 F.2d 1438 (5th
Cir. 1989), United Airlines, see Rakestraw v. United Airlines Inc., 981 F.2d 1524 (7th Cir. 1992),
Trans World Airlines, see TWA Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989),
Eastern Airlines, see Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 744 F. Supp. 1140 (S.D.FI.
1990), Greyhound, see Proposed Greyhound Settlement Includes $22 Million in Back Pay, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 75, at C-1 (Apr. 21, 1993), Phelps Dodge, see United Steelworkers of America v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 833 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989), A.T. Massey,
see Tall Timber Mine and United Mine Workers of America, District 17, Local 1440, Mar. 24, 1992
(M. LeRoy, Arb.) (unpublished decision on file with author), the Pittston Group, see Ratification of
Pittston Contract Hailed by Union Leaders, Secretary Dole, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 35, at A-7, -
10 (Feb. 21, 1990); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (1994),
the Chicago Tribune. see Chicago Tribune Co. v. Graphic Communications Union, Local 7, 138
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1041 (1991), the Pittsburgh Press, see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Preate, 797 F. Supp.
436, 444 (W.D.Pa. 1992), afftd, No. 92-3486, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33096 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 1992),
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The hiring of permanent replacements was not seriously challenged until
1991, when the House of Representatives passed the Workplace Fairness Act
prohibiting employers from hiring permanent striker replacements. 6 However,
the bill failed to garner the two-thirds majority necessary to override a
promised veto by President Bush.7 It subsequently died in the Senate due, in
large part, to strong opposition by Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KN).8
Geo A. Hormel, see William Serrin, Hormel Plant Shuts as Troops Arrive and Strikers Thin Ranks,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1986, at A12; Hardy Green, ON STRIKE AT HORMEL: THE STRUGGLE FOR A
DEMOCRATIC LABOR MOVEMENT (1990); Dave Hage and Paul Klauda, NO RETREAT, NO SURRENDER:
LABOR'S WAR AT HORMEL (1989), International Paper, see Adrienne M. Bierecree, Capital Restructur-
ing and Labor Relations: The International Paper Strike, 1 INT'L CONTRIBUTIONS TO LABOUR STUDIES
59, 72-73 (1991), Colt Industries, see NLRB Administrative Law Judge Finds Colt Strike Caused Unfair
Labor Practices, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 177, at A-I I (Sept. 14, 1989); Colt Told to Rehire 800
Strikers; Back Pay Is to Be in Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1989, at B3, Caterpillar, see Robert L.
Rose, Thousands Respond to Caterpillar Ads to Replace Striking Workers in Illinois, WALL ST. J., Apr.
8. 1992, at A3, Bridgestone/Firestone, see Raju Narisetti, Bridgestone Says Not All Strikers Can Return
to Work, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1995, at A4, major league umpires, Umpires Call "Strike"- A Different
Kind, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 16, 1979, at 8, and major league baseball players, see Peter
T. Kilborn, Bitter Sweet Success: The Failure of Replacement Baseball is a Labor Victory, and an
Exception, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at A16.
6. The Workplace Fairness Act passed on a recorded vote of 247-182 on July 17, 1991. The bill
would have amended the NLRA and RLA by prohibiting two employer practices:
(i) to offer, or to grant, the status of permanent replacement employee to an individual for
performing bargaining unit work for the employer during a labor dispute; or (ii) to otherwise
offer, or grant, an individual any employment preference based on the fact that such individual
was employed, or indicated a willingness to be employed, during a labor dispute over an
individual who-(A) was an employee of the employer at the commencement of the dispute;
(B) has exercised the right to join, to assist, or to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection through the labor
organization involved in the dispute; and (C) is working for, or has unconditionally offered
to return to work for, the employer.
H.R. 3936, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). There were several precursors to the Workplace Fairness Act.
For example, Rep. William Clay (D-Mo.) introduced on February 1, 1990, the first proposal for an
outright ban on employer hiring of permanent striker replacements. See Strike Replacement Bill
Introduced by Rep. Clay, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 24, at A-7 (February 5, 1990). But the bill died
in subcommittee. On June 11, 1992, Senator Bob Packwood (R-OR) introduced an alternative to the
Workplace Fairness Act in a compromise amendment that provided for a form of "advisory arbitration"
during contract impasses. See Text of Substitute Version of S. 55, Including the Packwood Amendment,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 115, at D-1, D-2 (June 15, 1992). However, on June 16 it failed along
with the Workplace Fairness Act on a 57-42 cloture vote. Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict Use of
Permanent Striker Replacements, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 117, at A-9 (June 17, 1992).
7. Striker Replacement Bill Faces Uncertain Future in Senate, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 143,
at A-17 (July 25, 1991). President Bush had issued a statement that he planned to veto any striker
replacement bill; he argued that such legislation "would destroy a prime component of the economic
balance between labor and management in collective bargaining." Administration Policy Statement on
S. 55 Workplace Fairness Act, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 112, at F-1 (June 10, 1992).
8. See Striker Replacement Bill Is Dead, Sen. Dole Tells National Grocers, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 122, at A-6 (June 25, 1991). See also 140 CONG.REC. S8537-01 (daily ed. July 12, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Dole) ("Without the prospect of permanent striker replacement, unions will resort
to the strike weapon more and more frequently. Consumer process will rise, jobs will be lost,
communities will plunge into chaos."). President Clinton's election initially raised expectations of the
enactment of a strikers' rights bill. Labor's Agenda Seen Rising under Clinton, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
No. 11, at A-6 (January 19, 1993). But Senate Democrats' failure to end a Republican filibuster
followed by the Republicans' winning of majorities in both houses of Congress meant that no such
legislation would pass in the foreseeable future. Senate Vote to End Filibuster on Striker Replacement
Fails 53-47, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 133, at AA-1 (July 13, 1994); Defeat of Striker Replacement
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Nonetheless, unions and employers continue to argue intensely over various
proposals to limit the hiring of permanent replacements.
The stakes for labor and management are high. On one side, unions and
their congressional supporters contend that the doctrine enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Mackay Radio essentially permits employers to discharge
strikers by allowing replacements to remain in their positions indefinitely.9
This, they say, leads to an intolerable incongruity in the law because the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' ° and the Railway Labor Act (RLA)"
expressly safeguard the right to strike.1 2 Union representatives have testified
before Congress that over 20,000 strikers who were simply exercising their
right to strike have lost their jobs to replacements. I3
On the other side, employers and their congressional supporters argue that
what unions really want is the right to win every strike. 4 They attest to the
damaging effects of strikes 5 and insist that employers would be forced to
cease operating if prohibited from hiring permanent striker replacements. 6
Bill A Victory for Business Coalition, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 134, at AA-1 (July 14, 1994).
9. See Statements and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55 by Sen. Bob Packwood and AFL-CIO
President Lane Kirkland, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 114, at E-I (June 12, 1992) (quoting Lane
Kirkland saying, "Current U.S. labor law says you cannot be fired for striking, but you can be
'permanently replaced.' That meaningless distinction has cost tens of thousands of workers their jobs
and incomes, their pension and health care, their homes and'dignity.").
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-200 (1994).
11. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
12. See 29 U.S.C. §163 (1994) (stating that "nothing in this subchapter ... shall be construed so
as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike"). The RLA limits the
right to strike procedurally by providing mediation, fact-finding, and an emergency board to break
contract impasses. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 152-160 (1993). Nevertheless, "[i]mplicit in the statutory scheme
... is the ultimate right to self-help-the inevitable alternative in a statutory scheme which deliberately
denies the final power to compel arbitration." Florida East Coast Railway v. Bhd. of Railroad Trainmen,
336 F.2d 172, 181 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965).
13. Stephen Franklin & Michael Arndt, Time Grows Short in Battle Over Striker-Replacement Bill,
CHI. TRiB., June 14, 1994, at C1, C2 (noting that the AFL-CIO estimates that at least 20,000 strikers
have lost their jobs). Some of these strikers have testified at congressional hearings about the devastating
consequences of being permanently replaced. See Prohibiting Discrimination Against Economic Strikers:
Hearing on S. 55 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1991) (according to striker Karen Behnke, "[t]he strike has
caused enormous hardships for the strikers and their families.").
14. See Prohibiting Discrimination Against Economic Strikers: Hearing on S. 55 before the
Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 168 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
15. Preventing Replacement of Economic Strikers: Hearing on S. 2112 Before the Subcommittee on
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (June 6,
1990) [hereinafter Preventing Replacements] (testimony of Richard S. Hoyt, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce):
My business, like many others, is labor intensive and operates under severe time constraints.
If I cannot provide my customers with a product within budget and on time, they will find a
contractor who can. Disruptions caused by labor disputes are costly and counterproductive in
any industry, but especially in the construction industry, where work is performed
sequentially. A work stoppage caused by a labor protest at a critical stage of a multiemployer
construction project can bring the entire project to a standstill.
16. See id. at 126 (testimony of James P. Melican, Senior Vice President of International Paper)
("Why does an employer hire permanent replacements? Usually it is because the only alternative is to
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Moreover, they believe that U.S. businesses forced to capitulate to striker
demands would be less competitive in global markets. 7
Employers also point to existing restrictions on their right to hire permanent
replacements and continuing obligations to striking workers. Employers can
hire only temporary replacements for unfair labor practice (ULP) strikers."8
Presumably, this increases the bargaining power of ULP strikers because few
potential employees would be willing to work in a temporary job. Even in an
economic strike, an employer must reinstate strikers when they unconditionally
offer to return to work, provided that their positions have not been filled or
that a permanent employee vacates the position.' 9 Also, an employer cannot
entice replacements by offering certain employment preferences, such as
enhanced seniority.2 '
Debate surrounding the Workplace Fairness Act has relied chiefly upon
anecdotal evidence, each side rushing to Capitol Hill to recount their respective
story. This Article endeavors to advance debate by contributing empirical
analysis regarding employer compliance with existing law.2 Part I traces the
evolution of striker rights following the Supreme Court's Mackay Radio
decision in 1938. There, I discuss how subsequent decisions by lower courts
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have significantly limited an
employer's right to hire permanent striker replacements. Part II describes the
research methodology used in this study.
Part III documents the results of the study of 292 adjudicated decisions
concerning permanent replacement strikes from 1935 to 1991. It reports six
basic findings: (1) The percentage of decisions finding employer violation of
strikers' right to be listed for eventual reinstatement has fallen in the past two
decades; (2) the percentage of decisions finding employer violation of the duty
to recall strikers has changed little but has remained moderately high; (3) few
shut down the operation. Very few employers can keep an operation running for any sustained period
of time utilizing supervisory personnel, and temporary replacements are frequently impossible to come
by"). But see Robert L. Rose, Temporary Heaven: A Job at Struck Caterpillar, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29,
1994, at BI, B7 (reporting on Caterpillar's hiring of many temporary replacements for striking UAW
workers); Robert L. Rose, Caterpillar and Striking UAW to Meet U.S. Mediator; Firm Curbs Agenda,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1995, at A14 (reporting that the employer has the "upper hand" in responding
to a large strike, in part because temporary workers have helped keep their plants open).
17. See Prohibiting Permanent Replacement of Striking Workers: Hearing on H.R. 5 Before the
Subcommittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 209 (1991) (testimony of Alliance to Keep America Working) (explaining that "by forcing an
employer to accept demands for higher wages ... the bill would logically result in making American
products too expensive to compete in Europe and Japan... or anywhere else in the world").
18. An unfair labor practice striker is someone who withholds her labor partly or wholly because
of an unfair labor practice committed by an employer. See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1100-1104.
19. See Laidlaw Corp. and Local 681, Int'l Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers, 171
N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1.969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
20. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
21. See also Michael H. LeRoy, The Changing Character of Strikes Involving Permanent Striker
Replacements, 1935-1990, 16 J. LAB. RESEARCH (forthcoming summer, 1995) (finding high rates of
NLRB rulings that employers committed unfair labor practices in the course of replacement strikes).
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decisions have resulted in a finding that employers unlawfully discriminated
against strikers; (4) the percentage of decisions finding that employers had
unlawfully discharged strikers has remained consistent and moderately high; (5)
the percentage of decisions finding that employers granted nonstrikers
preferential treatment has fallen, but remained significant; and (6) the
percentage of decisions that have found that employers unlawfully failed to
reinstate ULP strikers has been fairly small but persistent.
Based on these results, Part IV outlines policy prescriptions. It suggests that
penalties for employer violation of striker rights should be increased and that
more aggressive use of injunctions under the NLRA should be made to deter
employer misconduct and to minimize injury to strikers from employer
violations. The Article concludes with observations about the prospects and
impetus for enactment of legislation to protect replaced strikers.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF STRIKER REPLACEMENT DOCTRINE
FOLLOWING MACKAY RADIO
A. The Genesis of the Permanent Striker Replacement Doctrine:
NLRB v. Mackay Radio
An employer's right to hire permanent striker replacements has its dubious
origin in NLRB v. Mackay Radio.22 In that case, the NLRB ruled that an
employer had unlawfully discriminated against five strike organizers by
refusing to reinstate them after the union had unconditionally ended the
strike.' The Supreme Court affirmed the NLRB ruling.' Had the Court
written a parsimonious decision, the matter would have ended there. But in
expansive dictum, the Court stated what has become popularized as the striker
replacement doctrine:
[An employer] is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers,
upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places
for them. The assurance by respondent [the employer] to those who accepted
employment during the strike that if they so desired their places might be
permanent was not an unfair labor practice, nor was it such to reinstate only so
many of the strikers as there were vacant places to be filled.'
Commentators have criticized this doctrine on various grounds. Some have
questioned whether such a doctrine can be based on dictum.26 Others have
expressed concern that this doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the core
22. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
23. Id. at 339, 347.
24. Id. at 347.
25. Id. at 345-46.
26. See Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL.
L. REV. 547, 548 (1990); Paul Weiler, Striking A New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects
for Union Representation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 351, 388 (1984).
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purpose of the NLRA: the protection of employee organization, collective
bargaining, and concerted activity.27 Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile § 163
of the NLRA, which expressly protects the right to strike,' with a doctrine
that appears to subject lawful striking to the seemingly heavy penalty of
permanent replacement.
Nevertheless, the striker replacement doctrine has endured. The Minnesota
Supreme Court recently offered what is perhaps the most convincing
explanation for Mackay Radio's durability: time. The striker replacement
doctrine remains because Congress has implicitly agreed for over fifty years
that it is consistent with the NLRA.29 Another possible explanation is that
Mackay Radio's dictum simply made explicit a well-settled common law
principle that derived from English labor statutes.30 As such, Mackay Radio's
dictum has endured because the idea that employers be permitted to hire
permanent striker replacements is so thoroughly embedded in American and
English law.
B. The ULP Striker Doctrine
Striker replacement doctrine has undergone numerous refinements since the
Supreme Court decided Mackay Radio. Over time, the NLRB has imposed
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (providing that "[ejmployees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . ."). See, e.g., Note, One Strike and You're Out?
Creating an Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARV. L. REV. 669, 674 (1993)
(concluding that "[elmployers currently abuse the right of hiring permanent replacements in order to rid
themselves of unions, thus destroying the benefits that unions provide."); Charles B. Craver, The
National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397,
421 (1992), (observing that "it is clear that the Mackay Radio decision severely undermined the
statutorily protected right of employees to strike."); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It
Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 295, 308 (1991) (noting that "the Mackay Radio doctrine is an increasingly
effective tool with which employers can undermine employees' efforts to organize themselves and to
meaningfully bargain with employers.").
28. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1992) ("Nothing in this subchapter ... shall be construed so as either to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike....").
29. See Midwest Motor Express v. IBT, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 890 (Minn. 1994)
(Fifty-five years have gone by since the Supreme Court ruled in Mackay that an employer does
not commit an unfair labor practice by hiring permanent replacements for striking employees.
More than 30 years ago the Court characterized the use of economic pressure as part and
parcel of the process of collective bargaining. In addition to major revisions of the basic
federal labor statute in 1947 and 1959, Congress has frequently demonstrated its capacity to
amend the statute to conform with its regulatory intention. But Congress has never seen fit to
limit in any respect the employer's right to hire permanent replacements for striking
employees.)
(Citations omitted).
30. See Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in the Public Policy of Striker Replacements:
Combination, Conspiracy, Concert and Cartelization, 34 B.C. L. REV. 257, 283 n.157 (1993)
(comparing an 1878 Connecticut statute prohibiting intimidation of a person seeking to engage in lawful
activity, such as a striker replacement seeking to cross a union's picket line, with the Conspiracy and
Protection Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86, § 3 (1875) (Eng.), prohibiting intimidation to compel a
person to abstain from engaging in lawful conduct).
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limitations on employers' use of permanent replacements. Most importantly,
the Board has held that no employer has a right to replace permanently an
unfair labor practice (ULP) striker.3' ULP strikes are strikes undertaken in
response to an employer's unlawful act, such as firing a striker,32 withholding
financial information during negotiations,33 or refusal to recognize a certified
bargaining agent.3" In addition, a strike that started off as an economic strike
may evolve into a ULP strike if the Board finds that the employer committed
a ULP during the strike. 35 As a result, a poorly timed ULP obviates Mackay
Radio's benefit to an employer.
Further, in Mastro Plastics Corp. & Local 3127, United Bhd. of Carpenters
and Joiners,36 the NLRB carved out an exception for ULP strikers to the
harsh sanctions of the Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA. 37 The Act
provided that a union must give sixty-day notice of intent to terminate or
modify an existing labor agreement3 and that if employees engaged in a strike
within that sixty-day period, they would lose their status as employees.
39
However, the NLRB held that when a spontaneous strike occurred to protest
the unlawful discharge of a union officer, strikers could not lose their status as
employees, even if they failed to provide proper notice of their intent to
strike.' The Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision, concluding that the
Taft-Hartley Act did not result in the strikers' loss of employment because their
"strike was not to terminate or modify the contract," but rather to contest an
unfair labor practice.4 ' As a result of Mastro Plastics, ULP strikers not only
remain employees under the NLRA, but are entitled to immediate reinstatement
once they end their strike.
C. Mitigation of the Mackay Radio Doctrine as Applied to Economic
Strikers
A second refinement of the striker replacement doctrine since Mackay
Radio has been the NLRB's position that in an economic strike, an employer
must offer reinstatement to strikers whose positions remain open. In Laidlaw
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. My Store, Inc., 345 F.2d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1965) ("That there may also
have been economic reasons for the strike did not deprive the strikers of their rights as unfair labor
practice strikers . .. .") (Citation omitted).
32. See Champ Corp., 291 N.L.R.B. 803 (1988).
33. See Blu-Fountain Manor, 270 N.L.R.B. 199 (1984), enforced, 785 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1986).
34. See Rose Printing Corp., 304 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1988).
35. See Burkart Foam, 283 N.L.R.B. 351 (1987), enforced, 848 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1988).
36. 103 N.L.R.B. 511, 515 (1953).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 141-87 (1994).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1994).
40. Mastro Plastics Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511, 515 (1953).
41. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 286 (1956).
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Corp. and Local 681, Int'l Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Wbrkers,"2
the NLRB provided that
economic strikers who unconditionally apply for reinstatement at a time when their
positions are filled by permanent replacements: (1) remain employees; and (2) are
entitled to full reinstatement upon the departure of replacements unless they have
in the meantime acquired regular and substantially equivalent employment, or the
employer can sustain his burden of proof that the failure to offer full reinstatement
was for legitimate and substantial business reasons.
43
Before this decision, an employer was only required to consider strikers for
reinstatement at the moment they applied for vacant positions." If the
employer refused to reinstate the striking employee to a vacant position without
a "legitimate and substantial business justification," the employer was guilty
of an unfair labor practice. 45 Nevertheless, this principle made a striker's
prospects entirely dependent on lucky timing. In Laidlaw Corp., the Board
eliminated this anomaly, stating that "an economic striker's right to full
reinstatement.., does not depend on [job] availability at the precise moment
of application . . . ."4 The Board further refined this regime in Rose
Printing47 by stating that an employer does not discharge its duty of reinstate-
ment of economic strikers by assigning them to positions inferior to their pre-
strike jobs."
Even though the Mastro Plastics and Laidlaw doctrines have significantly
curbed an employer's ability to use permanent replacements, employers may
still deny reinstatement to strikers who engage in strike-related misconduct.
The Supreme Court construed this doctrine one year after Mackay Radio in a
case involving strikers who were discharged for taking possession of and
blocking employer access to the plant during a sit-down strike.49 Consistent
with this doctrine, § 10(c) of the NLRA expressly forbids the Board from
requiring "the reinstatement of any individual . . . if such individual was
suspended or discharged for cause."5°
In replacement strikes, where picket line hostilities are more likely to
42. 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970).
43. 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369-70 (1968).
44, See Bartlett-Collins Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 395 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956).
45. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
46. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369 (1968), enforced 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
47. Rose Printing Corp., 304 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1988).
48. Id. at 1078. See also Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 680, 680-82 (1994) (holding
that an employer unlawfully discriminated against a striker by failing to assign him to a substantially
equivalent position that had become available, and instead assigning him to a more physically demanding
position).
49. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1992). Seealso NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962);
NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
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occur, the Board's definition of misconduct is particularly crucial. The Board
consistently defines misconduct to include assaults on nonstrikers5 and
malicious destruction of property.52 But the Board has wavered regarding its
treatment of strikers who verbally abuse replacements, crossovers53 and other
people coming into contact with a picket line. The Board's current definition
was set forth in Clear Pine Mouldings.' It broadened the misconduct standard
to include a striker's threat to harm a nonstriker, even if unaccompanied by a
physical act or gesture.55 The Board and courts have also negated an
employer's duty to reinstate ULP strikers when striker misconduct has been
egregious.
56
D. Preferential Treatment of Nonstrikers
In NUB v. Erie Resistor 7 the Supreme Court articulated a third refine-
ment of the striker replacement doctrine: a limitation upon the degree to which
an employer can give preferential treatment to nonstrikers in relation to
strikers. In that case, to continue operating its plant during an economic strike,
an employer offered any replacement or crossover twenty years of superseniori-
ty.1s Since seniority is often used to determine promotions and layoffs, this
practice would benefit replacements and crossovers at the expense of continuing
strikers. The Supreme Court ruled that such a grant violates § 8(a)(3) by
creating an intolerable breach in the bargaining unit: "This breach is re-
emphasized with each subsequent layoff and stands as an ever-present reminder
51. See NLRB v. Cambria Clay Products Co., 215 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1954).
52. See United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., Local 833 v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962); NLRB
v. Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1943); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472 (3d
Cir. 1939).
53. Like a striker replacement, a crossover crosses a union's picket line to perform bargaining unit
work during a strike. The key difference is that this person is not a new hire, but rather a person who
was employed in the bargaining unit when the strike began. See, e.g., Pattern Makers League v. NLRB,
473 U.S. 95, 97-98 (1985).
54. 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985). The Board's revised policy
is
that the existence of a "strike" in which some employees elect to voluntarily withhold their
services does not in any way privilege those employees to engage in other than peaceful
picketing and persuasion. They have no right, for example, to threaten those employees who,
for whatever reason, have decided to work during the strike, to block access to the employer's
premises, and certainly no right to carry or use weapons or other objects of intimidation.
Id. at 1047.
55. Id. at 1048. Before this decision, the Board protected such threats, viewing them as part of the
heated milieu of a picket line. See NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 528 (1st Cir. 1977).
56. See NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752-53 (1st Cir. 1954) ("[I]f the particular collective
action is not a protected § 7 activity, the employer commits no unfair labor practice by thus terminating
the employment relation."), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954). The NLRB initially rejected this
approach in Thayer II, 115 N.L.R.B. 1591 (1956), but adopted the reasoning in Blades Mfg. Co., 144
N.L.R.B. 561 (1963), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965).
57. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
58. Id. at 230-31.
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of the dangers connected with striking and with union activities in general. "9
To this doctrine, the NLRB added several other forms of prohibited preferen-
tial treatment: granting retroactive pay raises to replacements that exceed the
pay offered to strikers," and exempting replacements from a required
physical fitness exam applied to returning strikers.6
However, in TW4, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants,62 the
Supreme Court substantially narrowed Erie Resistor. During a strike by flight
attendants, TWA had attempted to lure crossovers by announcing that they
would obtain seniority advantage over strikers, thereby improving crossovers'
job and domicile assignments.6' However, in order to avoid the prohibitions
of Erie Resistor, TWA structured the enticement to allow junior crossovers to
bid and retain indefinitely a senior striker's domicile and scheduling prefer-
ence.' In short, TWA gave crossovers Erie Resistor preferences without
using twenty years' superseniority. The Court rejected the union's argument
that TWis plan violated Erie Resistor.' The Court observed, "While the
employer and union in many circumstances may reach a back-to-work
agreement that would displace crossovers and new hires .. . nothing in the
NLRA or the federal common law we have developed under that statute
requires such a result."' Thus, while the NLRB and the courts have
narrowed the Mackay Radio doctrine somewhat, employers retain a potent
weapon in replacements.
II. RESEARCH: METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
A. Methodology
The analysis in this Article is based on 292 NLRB rulings in cases
involving permanent striker replacements. Cases were identified through a
Westlaw keyword search.67 This list was supplemented by citations in cases
59. Id. at 231.
60. See Soule Glass & Glazing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 792 (1979), enforced in part, 652 F.2d 1055
(lst Cir. 1981).
61. See Craw & Son, 244 N.L.R.B. 241 (1979), enforced, 622 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1980).
62. 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
63. Id. at 430.
64. Id. at 430-34.
65. Id. at 438.
66. Id.
67. The keyword search was "MACKAY RADIO" & REPLACEMENT(!) OR "PERMANENT
REPLACEMENT!" & STRIKE(!). The symbol (!) extends a root word search. For example, it
generates a match for any case mentioning STRIKE, STRIKER, and STRIKES.
The objective of the keyword search was to identify as many cases involving strikes with permanent
replacements. Used alone, Mackay Radio would have likely identified many cases not involving
replacement strikes, since this was an early case construing the NLRA's very general prohibition against
anti-union discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). Accordingly, "replacement" and
"permanent replacement" were added to Mackay Radio to narrow the search to pertinent cases. These
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that referred to other replacement strikes that were not identified by the
keyword search. The resulting database consisted primarily of NLRB decisions
from 1938 (when the Supreme Court decided Mackay Radio) through May
1994. The search produced 385 cases, 87 of which were deleted from further
analysis because the strikes they reported did not involve actual employer
hiring of permanent striker replacements. Thus the sample contained 298
decisions, of which 292 were from the NLRB(1 and 6 were from federal
courts acting under jurisdiction created by the RLA or the federal bankruptcy
code.69 This study examines only the NLRB rulings under the NLRA, because
the RLA does not define employer unfair labor practices per se.
This sample of NLRB decisions is likely to capture a significant share of
the volume of replacement strikes that have occurred within the confines of the
NLRA. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which exercises discretionary
jurisdiction, the NLRB generally rules on all administrative decisions for which
it receives appeals.70 In addition, all unfair labor practice cases are "prosecut-
ed by an attorney for the regional office acting on behalf of the (NLRB's)
general counsel"7" so prosecution of these cases is not biased to omit
replacement strikes where unions lack litigation resources. Also, because
strikes are generally the ultimate employee action to exert economic pressure
on an employer, and the hiring of replacements is generally the ultimate
employer response to strikes, unions and employers generally have an interest
in appealing any adverse administrative decisions to the Board.
This study divided NLRB cases into two periods delineated by the year that
a particular change in striker replacement law or doctrine occurred. Once cases
were divided into two blocks of time, discriminant function analysis72 was
used to compare the percentage of cases finding that employers committed a
particular unfair labor practice involving replaced strikers. This permitted a
comparison of employer violation rates over periods and, also, an inference
about whether or not observed differences in these rates were statistically
two terms were added disjunctively to the search to avoid excluding cases in which the author only used
one phrasing to express the idea of strikers who were permanently replaced.
68. See infra Appendix I.
69. These replacement strike cases include Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886
(7th Cir. 1986); O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 886 F.2d 1438 (5th Cir. 1989); TWA v. Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S, 426 (1989); In re Continental Airlines, 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir.
1990); Eastern Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 744 F.Supp. 1140 (S.D. Fla. 1990); and Rakestraw
v. United Airlines, 981 F.2d 1524 (7th Cir. 1992).
70. Only 6 of these 298 cases involved disputes arising under the RLA which were adjudicated in
federal courts. The remaining 292 cases were strictly NLRB decisions. Although some of these cases
were appealed to a federal court, those federal court decisions are not part of this database.
71. See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1797-1800 (describing Board review of administrative law judges'
decisions).
72. Discriminant function analysis is a statistical technique that compares measurable characteristics
of cases belonging to one group to a second group of cases. See generally William R. Klecka,
Discriminant Analysis, in SPSS: STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 434-35 (Norman
Nie et al. eds., 1975).
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significant.73
B. Potential Limitations of Empirical Data
Although the methodology for identifying and classifying cases involving
striker replacements was designed to minimize biases, some distortion is
probably inevitable. A brief discussion of the limitations of the data follows.
Other potential sources of error and bias are discussed in Appendix III, infra.
The strikes in this database almost certainly do not include the entire
universe of all NLRA and RLA decisions involving permanent replacement
strikes, and the sample may not be entirely representative of this population of
decisions. The cases in the sample primarily involved employers or unions who
were charged with committing an unfair labor practice, or breaching some
other legal duty, during such a strike. Undoubtedly, some replacement strikes
never involved legal proceedings, or were settled at some point short of a
published decision.74 Therefore, this database may be biased to contain a
disproportionate share of unlawful activity during strikes or to contain the most
intractable and extreme cases decided by the Board and courts. It also means
that employers' use of the threat of replacement to scuttle a strike or force an
early settlement on the employers' terms will not be captured by the sample.
Notwithstanding these limitations, it is important to remember that this
study fills a virtual void in empirical studies of replacement strikes. 75
Empirical information, limited as it may be, contributes significantly to the
anecdotal evidence in this area. Thus, the best way to think about the findings
here is that they are preliminary and have some undetermined error component,
but nevertheless provide important new information.
III. RESULTS
Data were classified and analyzed and aggregated over discrete time periods
in order to measure employer compliance with existing laws governing
employer conduct during replacement strikes. Specifically, six questions were
considered: (1) How often employers failed to place economic strikers on
73. See infra text accompanying notes 155-160.
74. See Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 493-496 (1983) (discussing an employer who hired
permanent replacements for 400 striking employees, but later negotiated a strike-settlement agreement
providing for the strikers' return). This case never progressed beyond the NLRB regional director's
office. Id. at 495-96. It therefore did not result in a published Board decision. Moreover, if not for the
fact that replacements who were dismissed to make room for returning strikers sued in state court for
breach of contract to provide permanent employment, it is highly unlikely that this episode involving
permanent replacements would ever be reported in a court decision. In short, strike settlements
providing for reinstatement of strikers do occur, and probably diminish the likelihood of a published
decision recording the strike.
75. This study does, however, complement a long list of empirical studies about strikes in general.




reinstatement lists; (2) how often employers failed to recall the strikers who
were on reinstatement lists; (3) how often employers discriminated against the
strikers in recalling them; (4) how often employers unlawfully discharged
strikers; (5) how often employers granted nonstrikers (replacements and
crossovers) preferential treatment; and finally, (6) how often employers denied
reinstatement to unfair labor practice strikers.
Each of these questions corresponds to a specific legal duty of an employer
or right of an employee during a strike. Two reserch questions were derived
from the Board's seminal Laidlaw decision. Although that decision does notper
se require an employer to put replaced economic strikers on a reinstatement
list, this duty is almost certainly implied. In this case strikers offered
unconditionally to end their strike and return to work, but the employer
effectively treated them as discharged employees and told them to apply for
their jobs as if they were new applicants.76 Strikers then completed employ-
ment applications but because no vacancies occurred precisely when they
applied, their employer never recalled them. Meanwhile, the employer
"continu[ed] to advertise for and hire new unskilled employees."" Departing
from its doctrine requiring that employers only consider replaced strikers on
a nondiscriminatory basis as new applicants,7" the Board moved to require
that employers reinstate-not rehire-replaced economic strikers as job
vacancies arise in positions held by replacements.79 Laidlaw refers to
employees (strikers) with outstanding unconditional applications for reinstate-
ment,' and it is this language that all but requires employers to maintain a
"reinstatement list" for replaced economic strikers. Thus, this study examines
how frequently employers failed to comply with this particular duty."!
The next research question was based on extensive litigation involving
employers' failure to recall replaced strikers from a Laidlaw list. There are
many issue-variations on this theme: employer claims that business is declining,
so that there is no need to fill vacancies in jobs held by replacements;' that
the skill requirements in jobs held by departing replacements have increased
to the point where replaced strikers are no longer qualified;83 that the duty to
76. Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 102, 112 (7th Cir. 1969).
77. Id. at 106.
78. Bartlett-Collins Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 395, 398, aff'd sub nom. American Flint Glass Workers'
Union, 230 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956).
79. Laidlaw Corp., 414 F.2d at 103.
80. Id. at 105.
81. It was difficult to decide whether to analyze cases beginning in 1968, the year Laidlaw was
decided, or 1969, the first full year thereafter. Nineteen sixty-eight was used because the Board's revised
reinstatement policy was all but determined by two U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 1967: NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), and NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
82. See Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 1343 (1987), enforcement denied, 865 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.
1989).
83. See Lehigh Metal Fabricators, 267 N.L.R.B. 568 (1983), enforced, 735 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir.
1984).
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reinstate to the same type of job does not arise if a vacancy occurs in a
different facility operated by the employer;' that the duty to reinstate does
not arise when a replacement has not left a striker's job, but a new equivalent
job becomes available;' that laying off replacements does not create a
vacancy for reinstating strikers;86 that in recalling laid-off employees,
replacements with more seniority than strikers would be given priority;' and
more generally, that striker misconduct terminates any Laidlaw rights."8
Research questions on employer discrimination against strikers and
unlawful discharge of strikers were derived from Mackay Radio. That
decision's dictum on permanent replacements receives much attention, but the
decision also was important because it ruled that employers cannot discriminate
against replaced strikers on the basis of "their union activities. " ' Although
Mackay Radio involved selective reinstatement of replaced strikers and the
constructive discharge of others who were union activists, the Board has found
other forms of unlawful discrimination against replaced strikers.'c Thus, the
discrimination and discharge issues are related; the latter is almost always a
special case of the former.
The following question, relating to employer preferential treatment of
nonstrikers, is another way of asking whether an employer unlawfully
discriminated against strikers. Ordinarily this type of violation would have been
recorded along with those ruled as unlawful discrimination. 9' However, this
was separately measured because the Workplace Fairness Act specifically
included a proposal to grant an employment preference to nonstrikers over
strikers,'c and because some Board decisions use the "preferential treatment"
84. See Bryan Infants Wear Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1305 (1978).
85. See NLRB v. W.C. McQuaid, Inc., 617 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1980).
86. See Aqua-Chem, 288 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1988).
87. See Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1982).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 49-56.
89. NLRB v. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1938)
(The Board's findings as to discrimination are supported by evidence.... The Board found,
and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six of the eleven
[replaced strikers] and excluding five Who were active union men, the [employer's] officials
discriminated against the latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given
that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true
reason for the discrimination against them.)
90. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (finding that an employer's grant
of superseniority to replacements and not to strikers was unlawful discrimination); Soule Glass &
Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 246 N.L.R.B. 792 (1979) (finding that an employer's retroactive grant of a pay
raise to replacements in excess of pay offered to strikers was unlawful discrimination); NLRB v. Craw
& Son, 244 N.L.R.B. 241 (1979) (finding that an employer's requirement that replaced strikers take a
physical exam, but not replacements, was unlawful discrimination).
91. The Board treats these as § 8(a)(3) violations under the NLRA.
92. See supra note 6, part (ii). Arguably, this proposal merely duplicates the anti-discrimination




While Laidlaw provides a clear source for the reinstatement rights of
economic strikers, there is no single Supreme Court decision establishing the
doctrine providing added security against permanent replacement that ULP
strikers enjoy. At least as early as 1942 the NLRA was interpreted to provide
reinstatement for ULP strikers who offer to return to work, even if the
employer had to dismiss permanent replacements.' Litigation in 1952 further
refined the reinstatement doctrine, so that an employer's duty to reinstate did
not arise until employees made an unconditional demand for reinstatement.'
This study could have used the 1942 or 1952 decisions as starting points for
analyzing ULP reinstatement cases, but did not because these were only circuit
court decisions. Instead, 1957 was used because it was the first full year after
the U.S. Supreme Court made an important statement and ruling expressly
protecting ULP strikers. Affirming the Board's ruling requiring reinstatement
of seventy-seven ULP strikers who were discharged, the Court rejected the
employer's argument that this strike was not privileged because the union had
signed a pledge in the labor agreement not to strike: "[The employer's] unfair
labor practices provide adequate ground for the orderly strike that occurred
here. Under those circumstances, the striking employees do not lose their status
and are entitled to reinstatement with back pay."' Mastro Plastics was used
as the threshold ruling to study how often the Board did find that employers
fail to comply with their legal duty to reinstate ULP strikers.
A. Employer Compliance with Laidlaw Doctrine
1. Placement of Employees on Reinstatement Lists
The first analysis examines employer compliance with the Laidlaw doctrine:
the requirement that employers place economic strikers on a preferential
reinstatement list. The analysis begins in 1968, the year in which the Laidlaw
duty arose. The first comparison uses 1975 as a cutoff because a companion
study showed that employer use of replacement strikers rose sharply in that
year.
97
93. See e.g., Alaska Pulp Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1989) (finding that the employer's
apparent promises to replacements and to strikers who returned to work during the strike that,
in effect, they would always enjoy superseniority or other preferential treatment over those
employees who exercised their lawful right to remain on strike, are invalid insofar as the
fulfilling of such promises interferes with the rights of strikers.)
(Emphasis added).
94. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942).
95. See NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953).
96. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956) (emphasis added).
97. See Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, 16
BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. LAW 169 (1995). This study has three basic conclusions: contrary to
union assertions that replacement strikes rarely occurred before the 1981 PATCO strike, these strikes
Yale Law & Policy Review
The results, represented graphically in Figure Al,98 show that employer
violations of Laidlaw fell sharply in the most recent period, from 53.8% during
the 1968-1974 period to 24.4% during the 1975-1991 period. The second
comparison uses 1982 as a cut-off because a companion study again found a
sharp increase in the use of replacements from 1982 to 1990. 99 The results for
this comparison also show a marked decrease in Laidlaw violations, from
43.5% during the 1968-1981 period, to 12.5% during the 1982-1991 period.
One possible explanation of this general trend of increasing compliance is
that employers have grown more aware of their Laidlaw duties with the
passage of time and with increased experience in collective bargaining and
strikes. A key finding supporting this hypothesis is that only 32% of strikes
from 1935 to 1981 involved a union and employer with a bargaining history
(the other 68 % involved strikes to compel employer recognition of a union, or
strikes over failure to agree on a first contract), whereas 81 % of strikes from
1982 to 1990 involved parties with a bargaining history." ° One would expect
employers with collective bargaining experience to be more familiar with
Laidlaw's requirements than employers with less experience. In the most recent
period new unions, and hence new bargaining relationships, occurred much less
frequently than in earlier periods, 10' and so it is reasonable to infer that a
relatively high proportion of struck employers in the most recent period were
aware of their Laidlaw obligations.
Another possible explanation for the increase in Laidlaw compliance is that
employers are thinking more strategically about replacing economic strik-
ers."°2 If, in fact, an employer sees strategic value in using permanent
replacements, proper implementation of Laidlaw is essential. Administering a
reinstatement list is not terribly burdensome; whereas failure to administer such
a list could frustrate an employer's attempt to use replacement strikers because
it could convert an economic strike into a ULP strike, thereby subjecting
occurred continuously and sometimes at high levels, since 1935; contrary to employer assertions that
there was nothing unusual about current and recent replacement strike activity, these strikes occurred
at abnormally high levels from 1975 to 1991; and replacement strikes activity occurred in low activity
and high activity cycles for 1935 to 1991.
98. All references to figures hereinafter to infra Appendix II.
99. LeRoy, supra note 21.
100. Id. at Figure 3.
101. See Michael A. Curme et al., Union Membership and Contract Coverage in the United States,
1983-1988, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 5, 7-10 (1990); Steven G. Allen, Declining Unionization in
Construction: The Facts and the Reasons, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 343, 344-45 (1988).
102. United Auto Workers President Owen Bieber gave testimony on this point:
We believe the reason employers want to be able to use the threat of permanent replacements
is to strengthen their position in collective bargaining, and too often break the union. If the
employer can effectively threaten hiring permanent replacements, the workers will be less
likely to strike. And if they do still go out on strike, the employer can try to break the union
by permanently replacing the entire workforce and then encouraging the replacement workers
to vote to decertify.
Preventing Replacements, supra note 15, at 61.
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replacements hired after the ULP violation to displacement by strikers.
Still another, but rather attenuated, explanation for increased employer
compliance with Laidlaw is that in recent decades employers have recognized
that slack labor markets have rendered reinstatement lists largely meaningless.
Unemployment rates in the most recent period have been unusually high,
especially in unionized industries such as steel and auto manufacturing.' °"
Consequently, replacements, with few alternative job opportunities, are
conceivably more likely to stay in their jobs indefinitely, thereby precluding the
possibility that many employees on the reinstatement lists would ever be
rehired. Thus, an employer could comply with Laidlaw while employing (or
threatening to employ) what are effectively permanent replacements. "C4
2. Recall of Employees on Reinstatement Lists
While violations in Figure Al involve an employer's duty to put replaced
strikers on a list for eventual reinstatement, violations represented in Figure A2
involve situations in which the Board found that an employer had violated its
duty to reinstate a striker when such duty arose. " Using the same cutoff
years as Figure Al, Figure A2 illustrates no significant change between the
1968-74 period and the 1975-1991 period (steady at about 27%) and only a
slight increase between the 1968-1981 period and the 1982-1991 period (from
24% to 31%).
Two obvious conclusions may be inferred from Figure A2. First, there was
little change in employer violation rates over the periods analyzed. Second,
employer violation of striker reinstatement rights occurred with moderate
frequency-between 23% and 30%-from Laidlaw to now. It is important to
understand that employer violations may occur for very different reasons.
Hypothetically, one employer may wish to flout the law, and ignore sound
103. See LeRoy, supra note 97, at 186-90 (showing that national unemployment exceeded seven
percent every year since 1975, except 1978-1979, and 1987-1989). See also id. at n. 115 (indicating a
decline in employment in basic manufacturing).
104. The plausibility of this explanation is reinforced by one account of the 1991-92 United Auto
Workers strike against Caterpillar Corporation. After several months, the employer threatened to hire
permanent replacements for approximately 12,000 strikers in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Colorado.
Caterpillar installed toll-free telephones to take job applications from across the nation and received tens
of thousands of phone calls within a few hours. Robert L. Rose & Gregory A. Patterson, Caterpillar
Inc. Threatens to Replace UAW Strikers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1992, at A3. This occurred during a
recession in which employers laid off many thousands of employees.
105. Fact scenarios encompassed by these statistics include employer attempts to reinstate strikers
to inferior positions, see MCC Pacific Valves, 244 N.L.R.B. 931, 936 (1979), employer failure to recall
strikers because their jobs were transferred to another facility, see Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. and Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 313 N.L.R.B. 680, 681 (1994), or employer failure to recall strikers because
employers considered a striker's reinstatement right extinguished by interim employment, see Oregon
Steel Mills, Inc. and United Steelworkers of America, 300 N.L.R.B. 817, 821 (1990) (involving a
replaced striker who was denied reinstatement because the employer viewed the striker's periodic
employment in construction jobs as sufficient alternative employment. In doing so, the employer
overlooked evidence that the striker had been unemployed the last seven months).
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legal counsel to reinstate economic strikers in accordance with Laidlaw.
Another employer may have interpreted Laidlaw to mean that the duty to
reinstate did not arise because that employer may have redefined jobs during
a strike. Accordingly, that employer might have acted on a good-faith belief
that Laidlaw's requirement of striker reinstatement to the same or equivalent
job did not apply. Some violations, therefore, might have occurred because of
certain ambiguities in Laidlaw.
B. Mackay Radio Violations
Figure B shows the percentage of employers committing Mackay Radio
violations: discrimination against replaced strikers on the basis of union
activity.36 The statistics show that these violations have been relatively
infrequent since 1935, and particularly rare since 1976. In the two earliest
comparisons, 1935 to 1975 and 1935 to 1981,'07 employers unlawfully
discriminated against strikers in 17.4% and 14.7% of cases, respectively. For
the periods 1976-91 and 1982-91, discrimination on the basis of protected
activity fell sharply, to 4.8% and 4.2% respectively.
One plausible view of these statistics is that Mackay Radio has almost
completely succeeded in eradicating a crude employer response to strikes. In
part, this result may be explained by the fact that employers are receiving legal
advice discouraging this overt form of discrimination.
Yet the statistics may hide a more insidious labor practice: the replacement
of all strikers, regardless of union activity. As the Supreme Court held in its
1989 TWA decision,108 this practice would avoid a finding of discrimination.
The Court held that an employer did not unlawfully discriminate against
strikers by creating a system in which all full-term strikers would be
disadvantaged in recall and job-bidding rights as compared to all strike
crossovers and all striker replacements." 9
C. Unlawful Discharge of Replaced Strikers
Figure C shows cases involving unlawful discharge of replaced strikers.
These cases include two different types of dismissals. One occurs when an
employer, instead of replacing strikers and putting them on a reinstatement list,
106. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347 (1938) (concluding that "[tihe
Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six of the eleven
men and excluding five who were active union men, the [company's] officials discriminated against the
latter on account of their union activities .... ).
107. Nineteen seventy-five and 1981 were used as cutoffs because of preliminary studies separately,
indicating that employers began to confront strikers more aggressively at these times. This evidence
consists of a sharp increase in replacement strikes beginning in 1975, see LeRoy, supra note 97, and
a sharp increase in strike duration in 1982, see LeRoy. supra note 21.
108. TWA, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n. of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
109. Id. at 433.
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fires them. "The other occurs when an employer dismisses a striker for
strike-related misconduct."' The analysis uses 1984 as a cutoff because Clear
Pine Mouldings,"2 a leading case on striker misconduct, was decided that
year. Some commentators have speculated that the Board's new striker-
misconduct standard established in Clear Pine Mouldings would permit
employers to discharge a greater number of replaced strikers." 3
While Figure C shows no significant change in unlawful discharge since
1984, it is impossible to know from this data alone the impact of Clear Pine
Mouldings. In 32.3% of cases decided from 1935-84, the Board found
employers unlawfully discharged strikers; from 1985-91, the rate remained
essentially unchanged at 35.4%. Yet, this data does not reveal whether, in fact,
it became easier following Clear Pine Mouldings for employers to discharge
replaced strikers. All that can be said is that unlawful employer dismissal of
replaced strikers continues to comprise a significant percentage of replacement
cases despite doctrinal changes.
D. Preferential Treatment for Nonstrikers
Figure D illustrates cases involving allegations that employers granted
nonstrikers preferential treatment. The year Erie Resistor"4 was decided,
1963, was used as a cutoff. The Board found that employers unlawfully granted
employment preferences to non-strikers in 33.6% of cases from 1935 to 1963,
and in 24.8 % of cases from 1964 to 1991.
The relatively low level of Laidlaw violations compared to the relatively
high levels of Erie Resistor violations may reflect cost-benefit tradeoffs that
inhere in complying with particular aspects of striker replacement doctrine.
Compiling a Laidlaw list is a relatively lost-cost, penalty-avoidance measure.
In contrast, the economic temptation to grant nonstrikers preferential treatment
may be too great for many employers to resist." 5
110. See NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1953) (involving an
employer who fired economic strikers before filling their jobs with replacements).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 49-56.
112. 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
113. See, e.g., Albin Renauer, Reinstatement of Unfair Labor Practice Strikers Who Engage in
Strike-Related Misconduct: Repudiation of the Thayer Doctrine by Clear Pine Mouldings, 8 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 226, 256 (1986) (noting that the new standard "fails to recognize that some misconduct is
inevitable, especially during strikes protesting egregious unfair labor practices by the employer.").
114. 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (finding unlawful discrimination in employer's grant of superseniority
to replacements but not to strikers).
115. Another interesting finding in this analysis is that in the six cases from 1989 to 1991 involving
a charge that an employer unlawfully granted nonstrikers preferential treatment, not one judgement was
decided against an employer. (These negative results are not reflected in the chart.) While this result
may be a product of chance, an alternative explanation may be that it is due to the Supreme Court's
decision in TWA that made proof of unlawful preferential treatment more difficult.
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E. Failure to Reinstate ULP Strikers
Figure E shows the percentage of cases involving employer failure to
reinstate ULP strikers. Nineteen fifty-seven was used as one cut-off because
beginning in that year, all employers were under a duty to reinstate ULP
strikers who offered unconditionally to return to work, in accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision in Mastro Plastics."6 Nineteen eighty-one was
used as another cutoff for the same reason as explained in regard to Figures Al
and A2. From 1957 to 1981, the Board found that employers failed to reinstate
ULP strikers in 11.5% of cases. This statistic remained essentially unchanged
from 1982 to 1991, reaching an upper limit of 13.9%.
The results in Figure E are interesting because they capture double
violations committed by employers: first, the commission of an unfair labor
practice causing or prolonging a strike, and second, the failure to reinstate a
ULP striker. In short, Figure E focuses on a type of employer violation that
usually (but not always) indicates serious or egregious employer misconduct
during replacement strikes."' Results here suggest that the percentage of
employers committing more serious NLRA violations during replacement
strikes has remained relatively steady. This finding contradicts anecdotal
evidence offered by unions suggesting that the proportion of employers who
seriously violate the law during replacement strikes has grown since the early
1980s. Nevertheless, Figure E does suggest that in a relatively constant and
untrivial percentage of striker replacement cases, employers have been found
to have committed multiple violations.
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS
The data suggest several possible considerations in legislating further
protection for replaced strikers. First, the data presented here clearly show that
employers have been hiring permanent striker replacements since the NLRA
was enacted. The continuation of this practice may alone be a sufficient reason
to reject union arguments for a total ban on employer hiring of these
replacement workers. The practice is so embedded in the arsenal of economic
116. In Mackay Radio the Court ruled that the employer unlawfully discriminated against five
strikers, and therefore could not be permanently replaced. Therefore, this study might have considered
1939 as the first fullyear in which reinstatement of ULP strikers was recognized. However, this year
was not chosen because in 1947 Taft-Hartley expressly denied protection to strikers who failed to
provide 60-day notice of intent to modify or terminate their contract by excluding them as employees
under the NLRA. Thus, this provision exposed some ULP strikers who failed to give proper notice any
protection under the Act. Mastro Plastics, decided in 1956, extended this protection to ULP strikers.
For the purpose of collecting data decided under consistent legal rules, this study used 1957 as the
earliest cut-off year.
117. See discussion infra Appendix III, part M (explaining that a problem with data in this study
is that they often fail to quantify the magnitude of employer misconduct in a particular strike).
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weapons that underpins collective bargaining"' that its outright repeal might
create an unprecedented shift in the balance of bargaining power under the
NLRA. (Though some may argue that such a shift is not necessarily undesire-
able.)
But if there is no precedent for an outright ban on employer hiring of
permanent replacements, evidence presented here strongly suggests that some
employers have abused this privilege. Mackay Radio protects striking
employees from discharge, and yet the NLRB ruled in 35.4% of replacement
strike cases from 1985 to 1991 (Figure D) that employers unlawfully
discharged strikers. This is remarkable in view of Mackay Radio's provident
grant to employers enabling them to hire permanent replacements for strikers,
and raises this question: Why should so many employers exceed this grant, if
not for the purpose of sending a chilling message to all other employees who
engage in protected concerted activity? The contextual significance of this
particular violation is reason enough for more extensive regulation of employer
hiring of replacements. Moreover, the constancy of this violation rate from
1935 to 1991 (see Figure D) indicates that employer tendencies to overreach
against replaced strikers are virtually reflexive and are thoroughly ingrained.
Figure E provides a separate compelling justification for more intensive
regulation of struck employers. These statistics do not show employer
violations occurring in isolation. Instead, they show compound violations: first,
the occurrence of an unfair practice sufficient to cause or prolong a strike, and
then, employer failure to comply with a duty to reinstate an already aggrieved
striker. In short, Figure E is a proxy for how often employers engage in a
pattern of misconduct against replaced strikers. Roughly one in seven cases
(13.9%) from 1982 to 1991 resulted in this finding. The pattern suggests that
the present method for protecting the already limited rights of replaced strikers
is inadequate.
Lawmakers, therefore, should consider increasing penalties for employer
violations of strikers' rights." 9 One specific idea is to allow the NLRB to
118. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960) ("Mhe use of
economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception ... [to the] Act; it is
part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining.").
119. See, e.g., Paul Weiler & Guy Mundlak, New Directions for the Law of the Workplace, 102
YALE L.J. 1907, 1919 (1993)
([U]nder contemporary antidiscrimination legislation and wrongful dismissal litigation, there
is broad consensus in favor of substantial monetary awards (including explicitly punitive
damages) against firms that fire employees in contravention of public policy. It is high time,
then, that we applied that same principle to the remedies available under the NLRA-the legal
pioneer in
prohibiting firings for "bad reasons.").
See also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for
Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419, 514 (1992) (concluding that "[t]he
current remedial penalties of the National Labor Relations Act do not adequately deter costly strategic
behavior.").
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award double or treble backpay damages to economic strikers who are
unlawfully discharged and to ULP strikers who are not properly reinstated."2
This proposal recognizes the generous advantage over strikers that employers
already enjoy under Mackay Radio and seeks to deter employers from
unlawfully enlarging upon this advantage. It should be noted that this proposal
would not alter the balance of power between strikers and employers because
law-abiding employers would not be affected. Instead increased damages
improve employer compliance with already existing striker rights and employer
obligations by raising the costs for employers who ignore or flout the law.
The persistent occurrence of cases (roughly 25% from 1964 to 1991)
involving employers who unlawfully grant nonstrikers preferential treatment
(see Figure D) suggests a different approach. Breakout part (ii) of the
Workplace Fairness Act is a provision carefully tailored to deter this kind of
behavior. 121 The persistent violation rate over the most recent twenty-seven
years certainly suggests that § 8(a)(3) has failed to deter this form of employer
misconduct. This proposal would not end an employer's right to hire permanent
replacements. It would, however, end a different employer practice: dividing
and conquering a striking union by creating destructive cleavages within the
bargaining unit. 1
22
In addition, the data support recent NLRB efforts 23 to use its injunctive
In 1993, Sen. Paul Simon introduced S. 1553, the Labor Relations Remedies Act, providing treble
backpay for to employees illegally discharged for union activities. It also proposed to grant these
workers the right to sue for compensatory and punitive damages in their choice of state or federal
courts. Simon Introducing Bills to Reform NLRA by Increasing Penalties, Forcing Arbitration, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 202, at A-2, A-3 (Oct. 21, 1993).
120. Congress has already considered a similar bill. See S. 1553, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
121. See infra note 6 for text of provision. This provision is intended to repeal TWA by making it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to offer an employment preference to a striker replacement or
crossover without offering the same terms and conditions to continuing strikers. Its intent is to limit
discrimination on the basis of union activities against strikers.
122. This provision is clearly aimed at repealing TWA v. Independent Fed'n. of Flight Attendants,
489 U.S. 426 (1989). Justice Brennan described how employer grants of preferential treatment to
bargaining unit members who abandon the strike and return to work are inherently destructive of
employees' collective rights:
The employer's promise to members of the bargaining unit that they will not be displaced at
the end of a strike if they cross the picket lines addresses a far different incentive to
bargaining unit members than does the employer's promise of permanence to new hires. The
employer's threat to hire permanent replacements from outside the existing workforce puts
pressure on the strikers as a group to abandon the strike before their positions are filled by
others. But the employer's promise to members of the striking bargaining unit that if they
abandon the strike (or refuse to join it at the outset) they will retain their jobs at strike's end
in preference to more senior workers who remain on strike produces an additional dynamic:
now there is also an incentive for individual workers to seek to save (or improve) their own
positions at the expense of other members of the striking bargaining unit .... Such a 'divide
and conquer' tactic thus strike(s) a fundamental blow to union ... activity and the collective
bargaining process itself.
TWA v. Ind. Fed. of Flights Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 448-49 (1989) (Brennan J., dissenting) (quoting
majority opinion at 442).
123. See NLRB Counsel Feinstein Sees Growth in Injunctive Relief for ULP Cases, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 122, at A-4 (June 28, 1994).
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powers more aggressively to protect mistreated replaced strikers.'24 This
approach seems particularly appropriate for two types of cases examined in this
study: those involving employer failure to put economic strikers on a Laidlaw
reinstatement list (Figure Al), and those involving strikers who have been
discharged unlawfully (Figure C).
The first type of case implicates an employer who is failing to comply even
with its minimal legal obligation to economic strikers. Such a failure may be
due to ignorance of, or simple disregard for the law. In any case, failure to put
economic strikers on a reinstatement list is tantamount to discharging them.
Since loss of employment often brings immediate and irreparable harm to a
discharged employee, it would seem appropriate to use the NLRB's injunctive
power, early in the picture, to avert further such decisions.
The second type of case, unlawful discharge, includes cases where
employers are effectively extending their advantage under Mackay Radio by
discharging rather than replacing strikers. As with cases involving failure to put
strikers on a reinstatement list, injunctions should be used to avert the
immediate and often irreparable harm that discharged employees suffer.
Although evidence presented in this Article and its companion publications
leave many important questions about replacement strikes unanswered, it is
clear that in the past fifteen to twenty years, employers have attempted to
expand their right to hire replacement workers. They have hired permanent
replacements more often,'15 concentrated this strategy in settings where
previously they had bargained successfully with unions,126 and violated the
very limited rights of replaced strikers in roughly one-third of all cases,'27
notwithstanding their considerable advantage under Mackay Radio.
In the final analysis, employers and unions must realize that Mackay Radio
carefully balanced the competing interests involved in labor disputes. It
recognized an employer's right to hire permanent replacements, but also
recognized a striker's right to be treated without discrimination. If Mackay
Radio is to enjoy continued vitality, the portion of it condemning discrimination
against strikers needs to be strengthened. The policy prescriptions offered here
add to a growing body of thought suggesting that additional, but nevertheless
partial limits, should be placed on employer use of permanent striker replacements.12
124. Hardin, supra note 1, at 1819 (explaining that Congress authorized the Board to seek §100)
injunctions "because of the lengthy time period of administrative proceedings before the Board in unfair
labor practices," and citing S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947) ("It has sometimes been
possible for persons violating the Act to accomplish their illegal purpose before being placed under any
legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to preserve or restore the status quo.")).
125. LeRoy, supra note 97, at 208 (Figure 1).
126. LeRoy, supra note 21, at Figure 3.
127. See infra Figure C.
128. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Conmpetitive Product Markets, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 38 (1993) (endorsing the use of advisory interest arbitration as a substantial
limitation on an employer's right to hire permanent striker replacements); William R. Corbett, A
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V. CONCLUSION
Striker replacement legislation was labor's most important legislative
priority before Republicans took control of the 104th Congress. 29 However,
the outcome of the 1994 national elections means that in all likelihood such
legislation will not be seriously considered in the 104th Congress.m30 Ironical-
ly, though, replaced strikers who have lost several legislative battles in
Congress may soon receive the most significant improvement in their protection
to date. President Clinton has proposed an Executive Order that would bar
contractors who hire permanent striker replacements from receiving federal
contracts. 31 At the same time, the Clinton administration has pledged to
continue to try to find a legislative solution to the problems unions are
experiencing under Mackay Radio.'32 Not only is this a vital union issue, but
most of the general public does not approve of how employers use striker
replacements. 33
The Executive Order will further regulate employer use of permanent
striker replacements, as I have suggested, but its ultimate impact on employers'
decisions to hire permanent replacements will be limited. It is of course
inapplicable to employers who do not rely on federal contracts; in addition,
Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent Striker Replacements: "A Far Better Thing"
Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C.L. REV. 813, 886 (1994) (proposing a temporary ban on
employer hiring of permanent striker replacements until the NLRB determines, under expedited
proceedings, that the strike is economic in nature); Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the
Striker Replacement Issue, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 363, 400 (1992) (recommending legislative repeal, or
Board or appellate court reversal, of recent NLRB decisions that limit the reinstatement rights of
replaced strikers).
129. For example, prior to the 1992 vote on this bill, the AFL-CIO aired TV and radio ads in 20
key states with uncommitted legislators and provided more than 600 newspaper editors with fact sheets
answering questions about the bill. Muriel H. Cooper, Union Members Fired Up to Win Big on H.R.
5, AFL-CIO NEWS, July 8, 1991, at 1. In appealing to senators to vote for this bill, AFL-CIO president
Lane Kirkland said it was "the most important labor law initiative to come before the Congress in more
than a decade." Muriel Cooper, Labor Mobilizes for Final Push on S. 55, AFL-CIO NEWS, Mar. 30,
1991, at 1.
130. See Letter from Reps. Goodling and Fawell to President Clinton on Issue of Permanent
Replacement of Striking Workers, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 34, at E-1 (Feb. 21, 1995) (arguing
against any further regulation of an employer's right to hire .permanent striker replacements).
131. Executive Order No. 12,954, 29 C.F.R. 270 (1995). See also Labor Secretary Reich Discusses
Details of Proposed Executive Order on Strikers, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 35, at AA-I (Feb. 22,
1995) (reporting on President Clinton's plan to apply this bar to federal contracts over $100,000).
132. Gore Pledges Another Try at Striker Replacement, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 117, at D-4
(July 17, 1994) (reporting Vice President Gore's message to union members: "Make no mistake: this
is just a temporary setback. We're going to find a way to solve this problem."). See also James B.
Parks, Majority Not Enough To Pass S. 55 in Senate, AFL-CIO NEWS (July 25, 1994), at 1 (reporting
that "[wiorkers who had been deeply involved in the battle to pass S. 55 expressed their determination
to continue the fight.").
133. Poll Shows Two-Thirds ofAmericans Oppose Replacing Workers Who Strike, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 113, at AA-1 (June 15, 1994) (reporting AFL-CIO announcement of a national opinion poll
showing that 65% of respondents disapprove of employers being allowed to hire permanent striker
replacements).
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some employers may decide that the cost of forgoing federal contracts is small
compared to the economic utility in hiring permanent replacements. These
limitations suggest why additional regulation is necessary. The proposals
suggested herein would ensure that if employers do hire permanent replace-
ments, the existing rights of replaced strikers are adequately enforced.
The proposed Executive Order on striker replacements and the Republican
opposition it generated clearly demonstrate that the issue of regulating
employer use of striker replacements is not likely to disappear. Employers,
particularly large ones, continue to hire permanent replacements. Whether by
coincidence or design, on the first day in forty years that the Republican party
controlled Congress, Bridgestone/Firestone announced plans to hire 4000
permanent striker replacements. 134 In response, Democrats brought a motion
to pass a resolution condemning Bridgestone/Firestone's action directly to the
Senate floor. 35 Although the motion was tabled on a 56-23 roll call vote, it
signified Democrats' continued commitment to the issue of striker replacement.
The issue is likely to remain visible because this employer practice often
provokes violence and militancy. 36 Partly in response to the Hormel strike
involving the hiring of 1025 permanent replacements, and the rioting this
action precipitated,' 37 Minnesota enacted the Picket Line Peace Act. 138 This
law expressly prohibited private employers in the state from hiring permanent
replacements. Although it was ruled to be preempted by the NLRA, 139 it
nevertheless underscored public concern about the harmful externalities of
replacement strikes.
While Minnesota implicitly blamed employers for the violence resulting
from replacement strikes, Virginia implicitly placed the blame on strikers.
When Pittston Coal Group hired 1700 permanent replacements," and
strikers responded by littering highways with dangerous jackrocks and throwing
rocks at passing vehicles, 4 ' a state judge levied heavy coercive civil con-
134. Raju Narisetti, Bridgestone/Firestone Begins to Hire Permanent Replacements for Strikers,
WALL ST. J. Jan. 5, 1995, at A3.
135. Gary Minich, Senate Takes Up Strike, HERALD & REVIEW, Jan. 7, 1995, at 1.
136. Forexample, when Bridgestone/Firestone contemplated making temporary striker replacements
permanent in December 1994, picket line violence flared. One striker was charged with bombing the
home of a replacement in Polk County, Iowa. Another striker allegedly impaled a striker with a tire
iron, and a local union president was charged with using a baseball bat to smash a replacement worker's
windshield. Report from the Picket Lines: Rubber Strike Starting to Burn, LAB. TRENDS, Dec. 3, 1994,
at 1.
137. See William Serrin, Hormel Opens Plant as Guardsmen Bar Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1986, at 12.
138. Act of June 1, 1991, ch. 239, sec. 1, § 179.12(9), 1991 Minn. Laws 728, 729.
139. Midwest Motor Express v. Local 120,512 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1994); Employer'sAss'n, Inc.
v. United Steelworkers of America, 19 F.3d 405 (8th Cir. 1994).
140. Proposed Settlement of Charges in Pittston Strike Agreed to by NLRB, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 29, at A-5, A-6 (Feb. 12, 1990).
141. Mine Workers Chief Says Pittston Strike Underscores Need for Overhaul ofLabor Law, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 160, at A-9, A-I1 (Aug. 19, 1989) (reporting a Pittston official's account that
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tempt fines to end this threatening conduct. 42 The Supreme Court eventually
ruled that these fines were unconstitutional.'43 Even in garden variety
replacement strikes, some violence perpetrated by highly frustrated individuals
is all but inevitable.'" Together, the Virginia and Minnesota cases span the
spectrum of state regulation of violence stemming from the hiring of permanent
replacements.
The futility of these responses 45 demonstrates the need for some form of
additional national regulation. Because state regulation of violence resulting
from replacement strikes is inadequate, the need for more national regulation
of these strikes will continue. For now, the nation appears to be at a watershed
as the issue of striker replacement remains controversial and heavily debated.
Hopefully, this Article will improve the quality of the ensuing public policy
debate by providing the first statistical analysis of how employers treat replaced
strikers.
since the strike began, some employees had been beaten and shot at, had their vehicles bombed, and
with the company, had 700 truck windows smashed and 3,000 tires punctured).
142. Bagwell v. International Union, UMWA, 423 S.E. 2d 349, 352-53 (1992).
143. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (1994).
144. As the 104th Congress was preparing to convene, a little publicized strike involving permanent
striker replacements for hundreds of meatpackers in Grayson, Kentucky was occasioned by violence.
Nothing about this violence was particularly unusual for a replacement strike. Gunshots were fired at
four strikers who were in union headquarters. Shots Fired at Cook's; No Injuries Reported, GRAYSON-
JOURNAL ENQUIRER (Grayson, KY), Dec. 22, 1993, at 1 (copy on file with author). In another incident,
a striker attempting to drive replacements off the road was convicted for wanton endangerment. Coal
Striker Gives Alford Plea, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Ashland, KY), Dec. 24, 1994, at 7 (copy on file with
author). This kind of strike, while failing to attract national attention because large numbers of workers,
big-name employers, and trendy issues have not been involved, nevertheless typifies the intense
divisiveness that communities experience when permanent replacements cross hostile picket lines.
145. See, e.g., Midwest Motor Express v. IBT, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 894 (Minn. 1994)
("[A]lthough not the foundation for this dissent, Minnesota does have the right to pass laws to protect
the safety of its citizens. Section 179.12(9) does just that. The most important factor contributing to
strike-related violence ... is the perception by strikers that 'their job security is being threatened.'")
(Wahl, J., dissenting).
The U.S. Supreme Court's Bagwell decision prohibits a court from responding to striker violence
speedily and summarily by imposing very large fines. In light of this, it is useful to consider the state
judge's rationale for imposing fines in the first place: "This injunction is designed to keep the peace here
in Virginia and to be sure that the ... the citizens of this state, in these communities, can live in peace,
free from the acts of terror which have been committed upon this community." 423 SE. 2d at 353.
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APPENDIX I: TABLE OF CASES
(Arranged Alphabetically by Decision Year)
* Decision Year 1938
C.G. Conn, Ltd., 10 N.L.R.B. 498 (1938).
* Decision Year 1939
Adams Brother Manifold Printing Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 974 (1939).
American Range Lines, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 139 (1939).
Calmar Steamship Corp., 18 N.L.R.B. 1 (1939).
Eagle-Picher Mining, 16 N.L.R.B. 727 (1939).
Gulf Public Service Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 562 (1939).
Stewart Die Casting Corp., 14 N.L.R.B. 872 (1939).
Williams Coal Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 579 (1939).
* Decision Year 1940
Alladin Industries, Inc., 22 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1940).
American Shoe Machinery & Tool Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 1315 (1940).
Chicago Casket Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 235 (1940).
Klauber Wngenheim Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 245 (1940).
Kroger Grocer & Baking Co., 27 N.L.R.B. 250 (1940).
Lansing Co., 20 N.L.R.B. 434 (1940).
Lone Star Gas Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 420 (1940).
Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Railway Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 82 (1940).
Paper, Calmenson & Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 553 (1940).
Phelps Dodge Corp., 19 N.L.R.B. 547 (1940).
Washington Woolen Mills, 23 N.L.R.B. 1 (1940).
* Decision Year 1941
Manville Jenckes Corp., 30 N.L.R.B. 382 (1941).
National Seal Corp., 30 N.L.R.B. 188 (1941).
New York & Puerto Rico Steamship Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1941).
Ore Steamship Corp., 29 N.L.R.B. 954 (1941).
Sam M. Jackson, et al., 34 N.L.R.B. 194 (1941).
S.H. Kress & Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 1152 (1941).
The Ohio Calcium Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 917 (1941).
Wilson & Co., Inc., 30 N.L.R.B. 314 (1941).
* Decision Year 1942
A. Sarterius & Co., 40 N.L.R.B. 107 (1942).
Burke Machine Tool Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 1329 (1942).
Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 N.L.R.B. 54 (1942).
Mrs. Natt's Bakery, 44 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1942).
Poultrymen's Service Ass'n, 41 N.L.R.B. 444 (1942).
The Barrett Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 1327 (1942).
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* Decision Year: 1943
American Bread Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1943).
Berkshire Knitting Mills, 46 N.L.R.B. 956 (1943).
Field Packing Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 850 (1943).
Industrial Cotton Mills, Inc., 50 N.L.R.B. 855 (1943).
Solvay Press Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1943).
Western Cartridge Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 444 (1943).
* Decision Year: 1944
No cases are in sample.
# Decision Year: 1945
Fairmont Creamery Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 824 (1945).
Republic Steel Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1945).
* Decision Year: 1946
No cases are in sample.
* Decision Year: 1947
lTimes Publishing, 72 N.L.R.B. 676 (1947).
* Decision Year: 1948
Autopart Mfg. Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 461 (1948).
Container Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1082 (1948).
Massey Gin & Machine Wrks, 78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948).
National Grinding Wheel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948).
* Decision Year: 1949
Ann Arbor Press, 85 N.L.R.B. 58 (1949).
Belmont Radion Corp., 83 N.L.R.B. 45 (1949).
Cathey Lumber Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 157 (1949).
Cincinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 592 (1949).
Columbia Pictures Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 586 (1949).
Kallaher & Mee, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 410 (1949).
Kansas Milling Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 925 (1949).
Olin Industries, 86 N.L.R.B. 203 (1949).
Myer Product Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 32 (1949).
Pacific Powder Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 280 (1949).
4 Decision Year: 1950
Luzerne Hide & Tallow Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950).
* Decision Year: 1951
Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 740 (1951).
Nashville Corp., & Avco Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1567 (1951).
Office Towel Supply Co., Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 449 (1951).
Roure-DuPont Mfg., Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1951).
Stilley Plywood Co., Inc., 94 N.L.R.B. 932 (1951).
Texas Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951).
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United States Cold Storage Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1951).
West Coast Casket Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 820 (1951).
+ Decision Year: 1952
Longview Furniture Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 301 (1952).
National Carbon Div., 100 N.L.R.B. 689 (1952).
National Gas Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952).
Rubin Bros. Footwear, 99 N.L.R.B. 610 (1952).
Texas Founders, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1952).
* Decision Year: 1953
Cowles Publishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 801 (1953).
Crowley's Milk Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 996 (1953).
Marden Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1953).
Mac Smith Garment Co., Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 84 (1953).
Mastro Plastics Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953).
Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 771 (1953).
Ohio Ferro Alloys Corp., 104 N.L.R.B., 542 (1953).
Pyrne & Co., Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 447 (1953).
Wheatland Electric Corp., Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1119 (1953).
+ Decision Year: 1954
Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 956 (1954).
Bartlett Collins Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 395 (1954).
B.VD. Co., Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1412 (1954).
Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 933 (1954).
* Decision Year: 1955
Brookeville Glove Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 213 (1955).
Broward Marine, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1955).
Robinson Freight Lines, 114 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1955).
* Decision Year: 1956
Belton Smelting & Refining WKbrks, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 495 (1956).
Cranston Print brks, Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 537 (1956).
Ford Radio and Mica Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1956).
Guistina Bros. Lumber Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 700 (1956).
* Decision Year: 1957
Bob Saunders Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 415 (1957).
California Date Growers Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 246 (1957).
* Decision Year: 1958
Economy Stores, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 1 (1958).
* Decision Year: 1959
Caldwell Packaging Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 495 (1959).
Crookston Times Printing Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 304 (1959).
Florida Citrus Canners Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1182 (1959).
WW Wllwork Fargo, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 91 (1959).
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* Decision Year: 1960
Barney's Supercenter, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1960).
Jackson Mfg. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 460 (1960).
Mission Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 275 (1960).
Orange Premium Stays, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. (1960).
* Decision Year: 1961
Erie Resistor Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 621 (1961).
Marydale Products Corp., Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1961).
New Orleans Roosevelt Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 248 (1961).
Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 519 (1961).
Illey Die Cast Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 508 (1961).
* Decision Year: 1962
Albritton Engineering Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1962).
American Optical Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 940 (1962).
Metropolitan Millworks, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1962).
Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 748 (1962).
Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962).
Sunbeam Lighting Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1248 (1962).
Titan Metal Mfg., Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196 (1962).
* Decision Year: 1963
Philip Carey Mfg., Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1963).
Sunbeam Plastics Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1963).
* Decision Year: 1964
Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802 (1964).
Little Rock Downtowner (The), Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1964).
Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 283 (1964).
Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 896 (1964).
Western Equipment Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 248 (1964).
* Decision Year: 1965
Crown Coach Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 625 (1965).
Empire Terminal Wrehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1359 (1965).
* Decision Year: 1966
John Kinkel & Son, 157 N.L.R.B. 744 (1966).
* Decision Year: 1967
Davis Wholesale Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 297 (1967).
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 514 (1967).
Local Union 8280, United Mine Wibrkers, 166 N.L.R.B. 271 (1967).
* Decision Year: 1968
Chatham Mfg. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1948 (1968).
Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968).
* Decision Year: 1969
Ace Drop Cloth Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 664 (1969).
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Downtowner of Shreveport (The), 175 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1969).
International Van Lines, 177 N.L.R.B. 353 (1969).
* Decision Year: 1970
American Photocopy Equipment, 186 N.L.R.B. 172 (1970).
Chef Nqthan Sez Eat Here, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 159 (1970).
Colonial Manor Convalescent Nursing Home, 184 N.L.R.B. 693 (1970).
Hartman Luggage Co., 183 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1970).
Little Rock Airmotive, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 666 (1970).
Shell Oil Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 941 (1970).
* Decision Year: 1971
H & F Binch, 188 N.L.R.B. 720 (1971).
Laher Spring & Electric Car Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 464 (1971).
Restaurant Ass'n of the State of Wubshington, 190 N.L.R.B. 133 (1971).
United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971).
* Decision Year: 1972
Service Protective Covers, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 977 (1972).
Southwest Engraving Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 694 (1972).
* Decision Year: 1973
CYR Bottling & Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 527 (1973).
Food Service Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 790 (1973).
Montgomery Wzrd & Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 593 (1973).
Ramona's Mexican Food Products, 203 N.L.R.B. 663 (1973).
* Decision Year: 1974
Bio-Science Laboratories, 209 N.L.R.B. 796 (1974).
Leon Ferenbach, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 896 (1974) (two strikes).
Westinghouse Learning Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 19 (1974).
* Decision Year: 1975
Eagle International, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 29 (1975).
* Decision Year: 1976
Newberry Energy Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 436 (1976).
* Decision Year: 1977
Charles D. Bonnano Linen Service, 229 N.L.R.B. 629 (1977).
Crossroads Chevrolet, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 728 (1977).
Methodist Hospital of Kentucky, 227 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1977).
Robins Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 549 (1977).
South Central Timber Development, 230 N.L.R.B. 468 (1977).
Windham Community Hospital, 230 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1977).
Wisconsin Packing Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 546 (1977).
Wbodland Hospital, 233 N.L.R.B. 782 (1977).
* Decision Year: 1978
Camay Drilling Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 997 (1978).
Carpenter Sprinkler Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 794 (1978).
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Pittsburgh & New England Trucking Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1706 (1978).
Standard Metal, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1978).
WC. McQuaid, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 177 (1978).
W-I Canteen Services, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 609 (1978).
* Decision Year: 1979
Atlantic Creosoting Co., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 192 (1979).
Burlington Homes, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1979).
Drug Package Co., Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 330 (1979).
Heritage House, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 242 (1979).
M.C.C. Pacific Ilve, 244 N.L.R.B. 931 (1979).
Markle Mfg. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1142 (1979).
Rainbow Coaches, 241 N.L.R.B. 589 (1979).
Superior National Bank, 246 N.L.R.B. 721 (1979).
* Decision Year: 1980
Associated Grocers, 253 N.L.R.B. 31 (1980).
Atlas Metal Parts, Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 205 (1980).
Harowe Servo Controls, 250 N.L.R.B. 958 (1980).
Interstate Paper Supply Co., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1423 (1980).
* Decision Year: 1981
Consolidated Dress Carriers, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 627 (1981).
Home Insulation Services, 255 N.L.R.B. 311 (1981).
Mark Twain Marine Industries, 254 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1981).
Randall Burkhart, 257 N.L.R.B. 1 (1981).
Research Products/Blakenship Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 19 (1981).
True Drilling Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 426 (1981).
Wlker Die Casting, 255 N.L.R.B. 212 (1981).
* Decision Year: 1982
Brinkerhoff Signal Corp., 264 N.L.R.B. 348 (1982).
Carruthers Ready Mix, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 739 (1982).
Chevron Chemical Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 44 (1982).
Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982).
Forest Beverage Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 285 (1982).
Heads & Threads Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 800 (1982).
Overhead Door Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 657 (1982).
Struthers Well Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1982).
+ Decision Year: 1983
Lehigh Metal Fabricators, 267 N.L.R.B. 568 (1983).
Whisper Soft Mills, 267 N.L.R.B. 813 (1983).
* Decision Year: 1984
Barry-Wehmiller Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 471 (1984).
Coca Cola of Memphis, 269 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1984).
Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. 173 (1984).
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Denver Hilton Hotel, 272 N.L.R.B. 488 (1984).
Gem City Ready Mix Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1984).
Harrison Ready Mix Concrete, 272 N.L.R.B. 331 (1984).
Harvey Engineering, 270 N.L.R.B. 1290 (1984).
* Decision Year: 1985
Brady-Stannard Motor Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1985).
Garrett Railroad Car, 275 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1985).
Medallion Kitchens, 275 N.L.R.B. 58 (1985).
Storall Mfg. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 220 (1985).
Wilder Construction, 276 N.L.R.B. 977 (1985).
* Decision Year: 1986
Lone Star Industries, 279 N.L.R.B. 550 (1986).
Pacific Mutual Door Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 854 (1986).
Rapid Armored Truck Corp., 281 N.L.R.B. 371 (1986).
Service Electric Co., 281 N.L.R.B. 633 (1986).
Wright Tool Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 1398 (1986).
Zartic, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 1478 (1986).
* Decision Year: 1987
Chromalloy American Corp., 286 N.L.R.B. 868 (1987).
Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 876 (1987).
Land Air Delivery, 287 N.L.R.B. 1131 (1987).
P & C Food Markets, 282 N.L.R.B. 894 (1987).
Sunbelt Enterprises, 285 N.L.R.B. 1155 (1987).
Tile, Terrazzo & Marble Contractors Ass'n, 287 N.L.R.B. 769.(1987).
* Decision Year: 1988
Aqua-Chem, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1988).
Armored Transfer Service, 287 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1988).
Champ Corp., 291 N.L.R.B. 803 (1988).
Christopher Construction, 288 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1988).
Delta Macon Brick & Tile Co., Inc., 830 (1988).
Facet Enterprises, 290 N.L.R.B. 152 (1988).
Gilmore Steel Corp., 291 N.L.R.B. 185 (1988).
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 358 (1988).
Oregon Steel Mills, 291 N.L.R.B. 195 (1988).
Reichold Chemicals, 288 N.L.R.B. 69 (1988).
Trumball Memorial Hospital, 288 N.L.R.B. 1429 (1988).
* Decision Year: 1989
Accurate Die Casting, 292 N.L.R.B. 284 (1989).
Alaska Pulp Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1989).
Chesapeake Plywood, 294 N.L.R.B. 210 (1989).
Crown Beer Div., 296 N.L.R.B. 541 (1989).
Elastic Nut Shop Div. of Harvard Industries, 294 N.L.R.B. 1102 (1989).
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Ford Bros., 294 N.L.R.B. 107 (1989).
Gloversville Embossing Corp., 297 N.L.R.B. 182 (1989).
Grocers Supply Co. (The), 294 N.L.R.B. 438 (1989).
Hydrologics, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1989).
Liston Brick of Corona, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 1181 (1989).
Massachusetts Coastal Foods, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 496 (1989).
Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 304 (1989).
Polynesian Hospital Tours, 297 N.L.R.B. 228 (1989).
Southwest Merchandising Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1001 (1989).
Virginia Holding Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. 182 (1989).
* Decision Year: 1990
Augusta Bakery Corp., 298 N.L.R.B. 58 (1990).
Gaywood Mfg. Co., 299 N.L.R.B. 697 (1990).
J.M. Sahlein Music Co., 299 N.L.R.B. 842 (1990).
Mohawk Liquer Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1990).
Wterbury Hospital (The), 300 N.L.R.B. 992 (1990).
* Decision Year: 1991
A.RA. Wrehouse, 302 N.L.R.B. 110 (1991).
Chicago Tribune, 304 N.L.R.B. 259 (1991).
Columbia Portland Cement, 303 N.L.R.B. 880 (1991).
Concrete Pipe & Products Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. 152 (1991).
Conway Central Express, 305 N.L.R.B. 837 (1991).
Daniel Finley Allen & Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 846 (1991).
New Life Bakery, 301 N.L.R.B. 421 (1991).
Rose Printing, 304 N.L.R.B. 1066 (1991).
Solar Turbines, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 14 (1991).
Textron, Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 660 (1991).
Transport Services Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 22 (1991).
* Decision Year: 1992
Harvey Mfg. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 465 (1992).
International Paper Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 31 (1992).
Noblit Bros., 309 N.L.R.B. 329 (1992).
Outboard Marine Corp., 307 N.L.R.B. 1333 (1992).
R & H Coal Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 28 (1992) (also contains information
on United Mine Workers/Pittston strike).
Sunland Construction Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1992).
TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1992).
* Decision Year: 1993
Auto Wrkers, Local Union 695, 311 N.L.R.B. 1328 (1993).
Domsey Trading Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 777 (1993).
Gibson Greeting, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1993).
Hormigonera Del Toa, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 956 (1993).
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Industrial Electric Reels, 310 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1993).
J.M.A. Holdings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1349 (1993).
Page Litho, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 881 (1993).
Park Manor Nursing Home, 312 N.L.R.B. 122 (1993).
R.E. Dietz Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 1259 (1993).
S & F Enterprises, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1993).
Sunol lley Golf Club & Recreation Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 357 (1993).
* Decision Year: 1994
Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (1994).
M.M.IC., Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. No. 179 (1994).







































































APPENDIX III: POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ERROR
I. SAMPLE OF CASES
A. Keyword Search
The keyword search utilized to identify striker replacement cases"
probably introduced some error into the database, particularly for cases in
which "replacement" was used exclusively. The problem with this term is that
it can also mean temporary replacement, but an adjudicatory decision would
not make this clear. For example, in the 1987 strike involving professional
football players, the athletes were replaced but the Board ruled in 1994 that this
was not a strike involving permanent replacements.
147
Unfortunately, many decisions were not as explicit as this one in indicating
that replacements were only temporary. Thus, all cases on the initial list were
examined in order to determine whether the strike involved the hiring of
permanent replacements. When cases were unclear on this critical point,
reasonable judgment was used to make an inference based on the full record.
To illustrate, consider a case that did not specifically indicate that permanent
replacements were hired. If the decision involved a Board order requiring an
employer to reinstate strikers with back pay while dismissing replacements, it
was included as a permanent replacement case. This inference is reasonable
because the back pay and dismissal of replacements indicate that replacements
were hired on a permanent basis, and had worked a significant period of
time. 148
B. Other Excluded Cases
The database excluded strikes occurring outside the NLRA or RLA.149
Although the NLRA and RLA cover most private-sector employees, they do
not cover strikes involving federal," state and municipal employees,'
146. See supra note 67.
147. See National Football League, 309 N.L.R.B. 78, 81 & n.13 (1992).
148. See, e.g., NLRB v. My Store, Inc., 345 F.2d 494, 498 (7t Cir. 1965).
149. See, e.g., United States v. PATCO, 525 F. Supp. 820, 822 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (reporting the
firing of striking air traffic controllers). The exclusion of this and similar cases from the database is
significant not only because of the large number of strikers and replacements involved, but also because
commentators maintain that this case influenced private sector employers. See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
102-57, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. Part 3 (1991) (observing that President Reagan's firing and permanent
replacement of 12,000 striking air traffic controllers in 1981 "was regarded by many observers as a
signal to the employer community that it was acceptable to dismiss striking workers.").
150. The NLRA's definition of employer expressly excludes "the United States or any wholly
owned Government corporation." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1993). Consequently, any strike involving federal
employees would not appear in this database. In any event, federal employees are prohibited from
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agricultural employees, 52 and certain health care employees because of the
exclusion of such employees from the Acts between 1947 and 1974.53
II. DATA CODING
Data coding presents another potential source of error. This study examines
NLRB rulings about particular aspects of employer treatment of replaced
strikers. Yet the methodology for collecting data on NLRB rulings was more
complicated and subjective than one might imagine. The variable NLRBRULE
was coded 0 if an employer was found to have committed no ULP, and 1 if
found to have committed one or more ULPs in the context of a replacement
strike. Even this information can be misleading. Hypothetically, if an employer
hired 1,000 permanent replacements, and the Board ruled that every hire was
lawful except one, which involved an illegal discharge of a striker,
NLRBRULE would be coded 1. Nominally, this would mean that the Board
found for the union and against the employer, and would appear as such in the
results reported here. In reality, the decision would amount to an employer
victory, because 999 of its replacement decisions would have been upheld. In
short, data on NLRB decisions do not capture the magnitude of violations that
occurred.
But trying to refine further the system used here is futile. Imagine a single
unlawful discharge occurring just as an economic strike was beginning (perhaps
an employer told a union officer that she was being fired for striking), and a
Board ruling that this isolated unlawful discharge converted the strike to an
ULP strike before any permanent replacements were hired. If this single
discharge was shown to prolong the strike by 999 co-workers, all of them
would be entitled to immediate reinstatement. 5 4 But if the discharge occurred
after the strike began and after permanent replacements were hired (perhaps the
striking. See Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7116(B)(7), 73 (1993).
151. The NLRA excludes from its definition of employer "any State or political subdivision thereof.
•.." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1993).
152. The NLRA expressly excludes from its definition of employee "any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1993).
153. Before the Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA, health care employees were covered. See,
e.g., In re Central Dispensary and Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533, 540-41 (1942). The 1947 Taft-
Hartley Act amended the NLRA definition of employer to exclude "any corporation or association
operating a hospital, if no part of the net retained earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual." Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 101, 2(2), 61 Stat. 136, 137 (1947). But
in 1974, Congress amended section 2(2), making the Act applicable to "health care institution[s]." Pub.
L. No. 93-360 §§ 1(a), 2(2), 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994)).
This database contains several cases reporting replacement strikes affecting the health care industry.
E.g., Park Manor Nursing Home, 312 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (1993); The Waterbury Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B.
992 (1990); Trumball Memorial Hospital, 288 N.L.R.B. 1429 (1988); Woodland Hospital, 233
N.L.R.B. 782 (1977); Windham Community Hospital, 230 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1977); Methodist Hospital
of Kentucky, 227 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1977); Colonial Manor Convalescent Nursing Home, 184 N.L.R.B.
693 (1970).
154. Cf. Burkart Foam, 283 N.L.R.B. 351 (1987), enforced, 848 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1988).
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employer erroneously discharged the striker for picket line misconduct), this
same violation would have no beneficial effect for the 999 co-workers. Thus,
even if data had been collected to try to capture the magnitude of employer
violations-perhaps by counting number of violations, or number of people
affected-these counting methods would have led to some misleading
inferences. The timing of employer violations and nature of NLRB rulings may
have fact-specific impacts that defied consistent quantification.
III. ACCOUNTING AND PLOTIING
With regard to the accounting and plotting of the incidence of employer
violations, several caveats apply. First, it is possible for the Board to find in
any single case that an employer has committed multiple unfair labor practices.
For example, it might find in one case that an employer unlawfully discharged
a replaced striker and separately granted an unlawful employment preference
to replacements. Thus, one case could result in two separate employer
violations. Over all the cases it is possible that in 80% of them employers
unlawfully discharged strikers, and in 40% of them they unlawfully granted an
employment preference to replacements. This means that percentage rates for
employer violations in all the charts should not be expected to sum to 100%.
Second, the results do not measure the gravity or pervasiveness of a given
unlawful labor practice within one strike; they only measure the number of
cases that involve that unlawful practice. For example, Figure A2 shows that
from 1982 to 1991, economic strikers were not properly recalled for
reinstatement in 30.6% of all cases, but a finding of one violation would be
indistinguishable from a finding of hundreds of violations occurring during one
strike. It is possible, therefore, that employer violation rates could be high but
reflect nothing more than the frequent occurrence of isolated or minor
infractions. Or it is possible that employers violated a specific duty-for
example, by discharging strikers-in a small percentage of cases, but did so in
an egregious manner. The egregious misconduct might be discharging all
strikers without cause (perhaps hundreds of employees) in a given case. This
misconduct would be recorded, however, as one type of violation occurring in
a single case, and thus would not represent the gravity of the misconduct. In
sum, this study counts rulings that involve alleged employer violations of
strikers' rights, but this counting does not suggest the magnitude, severity, or
quality of employer violations.
A third limitation is that many of the analyses reported in the charts are
based on small subsamples. To illustrate, the employer's duty to put replaced
strikers on a preferential reinstatement list did not arise until Laidlaw was
decided in 1967. Thus, 1968 was the first full year after that decision in which
employers should have been expected to comply with this legal duty.
Accordingly, only cases from 1968 to 1991 were analyzed, and cases from
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1935 to 1967 were deleted. As the footnote for Figure Al reports, only 157
cases were used for this analysis.1 55 The point here is that some analyses
involve relatively few cases, and hence, certain "small number" problems
arise.
One is that aberrations in employer conduct toward replaced strikers may
give a distorted statistical impression of underlying phenomena that are not
being captured by this methodology. For example, there was a concentration
of replacement strikes in the mining industry in the 1980s,56 and so there is
a possibility that analyses focusing on that period1 57 would amplify industry-
specific characteristics that would not generalize to other employers and
unions.
A second problem is that observed differences in employer violation rates
from one period to another would be less likely to be statistically significant.
The benefit of significance testing is that it minimizes the probability of falsely
concluding that a change in behavior has occurred when only random variation
produced some difference in employer-violation rates. At the same time, a
small sample might lead to a false conclusion that employer violation rates did
not significantly change, when in fact they did.' This study used a conven-
tional significance level (.05)"59 for rejecting the null hypothesis that no
change in employer violation rate occurred over the periods analyzed. The
practical import of using this standard relates to the fact that only one of the
analyses here showed a statistically significant difference in employer violation
rates.160 Practically speaking, there is only a small chance that this study
falsely concludes employer violations for failing to list strikers for reinstate-
ment fell over the periods analyzed.
Significance testing relates to whether change in employer violation rates
occurred. However, apart from whether change occurred from period A to
period B, the findings here give some baseline estimates of Board rulings that
employers violated the rights of replaced strikers. In most of the charts the data
do not permit a statistical inference that change occurred, but the charts
nevertheless show that employer violations occur at certain levels. This
155. This number is easily arrived at by adding the 26 cases for 1968-74 and 131 cases for 1975-
91, or the 85 cases from 1968-81 and 72 cases from 1982-91.
156. These included Phelps Dodge, Pittston Coal Group and A.T. Massey. See supra note 5.
157. See, e.g., cases from 1982 to 1991 in Figure E.
158. See Description of Subpopulations and Mean Difference Testing: Subprograms Breakdown and
T-Test, in SPSS, supra note 72, at 267, (observing that the "goal of the statistical analysis is to establish
whether or not a difference between two samples is significant. 'Significant' here does not mean
'important' or 'consequence'; it is used here to mean 'indicative of' or 'signifying' a true difference
between the two populations."). See also discussion of Type I and Type I1 errors in statistical inferences.
Id. at 268.
159. Id. at 268.
160. Figure Al, involving employer failure to put strikers on a reinstatement list, was significant
at the .05 level.
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"baseline" information is just as important for making informed judgments
about the effectiveness of existing striker replacement policy as information that
measures change.
IV. SUBJECTIVITY OF APPLICATION OF NLRA
One other data limitation should be noted. This Article reports NLRB
rulings on allegations that employers violated the rights of replaced strikers.
Since the NLRB is empowered to make these rulings,' it follows that Board
findings of violations equate to occurrence of unlawful employer conduct. But
before accepting this conclusion, one should consider that occasionally Board
rulings are reversed on appeal.' 62 This suggests two important caveats:
Sometimes the Board errs in applying the law, and at all times, application of
the NLRA involves a certain amount of subjectivity.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1992) ("[The] Board is empowered ... to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8 [section 158 of this title]) affecting
commerce.").
162. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (reversing the NLRB's
doctrine permitting nonemployee union organizers access to an employer's private property, stating:
"We cannot accept the Board's conclusion because it rests on erroneous legal foundations.") (citations
omitted).

